The Florida Commission on Ethics is going against the recommendation from one of its own advocates in an ethics case involving Lee County Sheriff Carmine Marceno.
In a press release issued Wednesday morning, the commission said it rejected the recommendation of its advocate and found no probable cause to believe that Marceno accepted a gift of furniture that exceeded $100 from a prohibited donor or, as an alternative, that he failed to report the furniture as a gift.
Additionally, the commission said no probable cause was found to believe that Marceno misused his position or violated the constitutional amendment prohibiting abuse of office to obtain a disproportionate benefit by employing the complainant as a consultant with the Lee County Sheriff's Office.
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According to the Ethics Commission, the advocate assigned to this case was Melody Hadley, an assistant attorney general with the Florida Attorney General’s Office.
A commission official also explained how the decision went through the system.
Once the preliminary investigation is complete, copies of the investigative report and the complaint are forwarded to the commission advocate, who is an assistant attorney general. The advocate reviews the materials and prepares a recommendation for the commission’s consideration. During a closed meeting (executive session), the commission determines whether there is probable cause to believe a violation of the ethics laws has occurred. The respondent, the complainant (the individual who filed the complaint), and their respective attorneys are permitted to attend. During the meeting, the commission advocate and the respondent have an opportunity to make presentations and may be questioned by commission members before a vote.
The Lee County Sheriff's Office provided a statement about the decision:
"On October 28, 2026, the Florida Commission on Ethics issued its final public report regarding allegations against Lee County Sheriff Carmine Marceno. Following its preliminary investigation, the Commission found no probable cause on any of the four alleged ethics violations. Notably, the Commission rejected its own Advocate’s recommendation regarding the gift-related allegation and determined that no probable cause existed. The complaint was dismissed in its entirety. These official findings provide important clarity and transparency, particularly in light of media coverage surrounding the allegations. The public deserves accurate reporting that clearly distinguishes unproven allegations from the Commission’s documented findings. The official record speaks for itself."
Earlier published reports said that an attorney for the Florida Commission on Ethics recommended a finding of probable cause that Marceno violated state gift-reporting laws in a complaint filed by his former friend, Bonita Springs jeweler Ken Romano.
Romano had earlier this year attempted to withdraw his complaint. A Sept. 1 story by The Florida Trident said Romano had requested that his ethics complaint against Marceno alleging undisclosed gifts and unlawful kickbacks be withdrawn.
“I am requesting this withdrawal for good cause, as the stress of this administrative process has severely impacted my health and exacerbated a diagnosed medical condition (PTSD),” Romano wrote in a notarized missive to the Florida Ethics Commission on July 30, the Trident reported. “I am unable to participate further in this matter.”
The Trident story said that Romano's request to withdraw came after months of the commission investigating his allegations. On June 5, state ethics investigator Ronald Moalli was granted a 60-day extension of the investigation beyond the 150-day statutory limit. Romano sent the withdrawal letter to the commission 55 days later, indicating the investigation was very close to completion, if not already finished.
RESPONDENT'S SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM OF LAW
BEFORE THE STATE OF FLORIDA COMMISSION ON ETHICS
FLORIDA COMMISSION ON ETHICS
OCT. O6 2026
In re: Carmine Marceno
Respondent,
Respondent, Carmine Marceno, provides this supplemental memorandum of law in support of his position that he did not receive a gift from the Complainant because equal or greater consideration was given within 90 days as contemplated by section 112.312(12), Fla. Stat. The Advocate narrowly and incorrectly construes this statute to require monies to be exchanged in order for valid consideration to be given. This misreads the wording and the intent of section 112.312(12). Rather, by providing tires and rims to Petitioner that were valued at twice as much as the furniture pursuant to his longstanding practice of giving something to the Complainant in return for what he had received, the Respondent amply satisfied the requirement that equal or greater consideration must be given.
First, the Florida Legislature could have specified in section 112.312(12) that consideration must be a monetary payment in exchange for the gift, but it did not do so. Rather it required "equal or greater consideration," which conveys that the Legislature intended for "consideration" to be anything of equal or greater value than the gift received, not just financial compensation. See section l l 2.312(12)(a), Fla. Stat.; see also Villanueva v. State, 200 So. 3d 47, 52 (Fla. 2016) (explaining that a court is not at liberty to add words to a statute that the Legislature itself has not used in drafting that statute); Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So. 2d 452, 454 (Fla. 1992) ("The Legislature must be understood to mean what it has plainly expressed and this excludes construction.") (quoting Van Pelt v. Hilliard, 78 So. 693, 694-95 (Fla. 1918)); Rebich v. Burdine 's & Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 417 So. 2d 284, 285 (Fla. I st DCA 1982) ("[T]he courts in construing a statute may not insert words or phrases in that statute or supply an omission that to all appearances was not in the minds of the legislators when the law was enacted.").
Looking to the plain meaning of the word, Merriam-Webster defines consideration as "an act or forbearance or the promise thereof done or given by one party in return for the act or promise of another." Consideration, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/consideration (last visit October 5, 2026). Decisions of Florida's appellate courts are also helpful in defining "consideration." Upon addressing a statute that lacked a definition of consideration, the First District Court of Appeal ascertained its "plain and ordinary meaning" from a dictionary, finding the definition to be: "[s]omething (such as an act, a forbearance, or a return promise) bargained for and received by a promisor from a promisee." 1701 Collins Miami Owner, LLC v. Dep't of Revenue, 321 So. 3d 875 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) and Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute) (internal quotation omitted). "Common types of consideration include real or personal property, a return promise, some act, or a forbearance." Id. (quoting Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute) (internal quotation omitted); see also Dorman v. Publix-Saenger-Sparks Theaters, Inc., 135 Fla. 284, 290-91 (Fla. 1938) (finding that consideration need not be money but may consist of either a benefit to the promisor or detriment to the promisee); Sinoen Koung v. Giordano, 346 So. 3d 108, 115 (Fla. l st DCA 2022) (finding that sufficient consideration exists when a promisee performs an act that it is not legally bound to do); Bayshore Royal Co. v. Doran Jason Co., 480 So. 2d 651, 656 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) (holding that sufficient consideration exists if a promisee does anything legal which he is not bound to do, or refrains from doing anything which he has a right to do). Notably, the Advocate's Recommendation includes a similar definition when discussing whether valid consideration was given by Respondent in the form of the tires and rims. Adv. Recom. p. I I n. 4.
Remarkably, the Advocate's Recommendation adds that the definition of "consideration" in conjunction with the statutory language of section 112.3148(8), Fla. Stat. "indicates that the reciprocal gift (i.e., tires and rims) should have a correlation in reducing the value of the furniture to $ l 00 or less[,]" and then gives an example of financial compensation, thereby implying that something else of value might suffice. Adv. Recom. p. 11. It is puzzling why the Recommendation then forecloses anything other than financial remuneration without citing any authority to support this conclusion.
In turning to the Commission's administrative rules, there is no constraint on the form of consideration that must be given. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 34-13.210(l)(c)l. To the contrary, the rule provides that "[ w]here the donee has provided items of merchandise, supplies, raw materials, or finished goods to the donor, the fair market value of the goods shall constitute consideration." Id. This is exactly what transpired between Respondent and Petitioner. Respondent provided merchandise/finished goods in the form of tires and rims to Petitioner in return for the furniture, and the fair market value of the goods was greater than the furniture provided to Respondent by Petitioner. Therefore, based on Fla. Admin. Code R. 34-13.210(l)(c)l, Respondent's provision of the rims and tires to Petitioner constitutes valid consideration which lowered the value of the furniture to below $100.
Previous opinions of this Commission also support Respondent's position that consideration can be fulfilled in more ways than financial compensation. Rule 34-13.2 IO has been cited in at least one Commission opinion to determine that non-monetary compensation constituted consideration that brought the value of a gift below $100. CEO 95-21. There, citing Rule 34-13.2101, the Commission determined that a stipend received by the donee was not a gift because the donee provided services of equal or greater value on a board of directors. CEO 95-21.
The Commission has elaborated on the meaning of a gift when consideration is given. In CEO O1-13 the Commission observed that the statutory definition of "gift" includes the concept of quid pro quo. Once again, the Commission has intimated that something more than financial compensation is sufficient.
It stands to reason that if labor provided to the donor constitutes consideration, as outlined in Rule 34-13.210, then the provision of merchandise/finished goods to the donor also constitutes consideration, as both are expressly stated in the Rule. See Rule 34-13.210(l)(c)l-2. In short, quid pro quo was satisfied in this case - goods for goods were exchanged.
As a whole, it is clear based on the plain meaning of the term "consideration," when viewed in light of the Commission's rules and prior opinions, as well as relevant case law, that financial compensation is not the only valid consideration for the purposes of section 112.312( I 2)(a), Fla. Stat. Rather, consideration may include the exchange of goods or services of equal or greater value than the gift received.
Accordingly, Respondent's reciprocation of rims and tires to Petitioner in exchange for the furniture received has provided equal or greater consideration for the furniture received. Therefore, by providing equal or greater consideration, no gift was received and consequently, no violation of either section 112.3148(4) or section 112.3148(8) occurred. The recommendation of probable cause should be denied.
Respectfully submitted this 6th day of October 2026.
1 The Rule also provides that labor or effort for the benefit of the donor can constitute consideration. Fla. Adm in. Code. R. 34-l3-2IO(l)(c)2.
Isl R. W Evans
ALLEN NORTON & BLUE, PA
906 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32303
PH: (850) 561-3503
revans@anblaw.com
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY, that on this 6th day of October 2026, a true and correct copy of the foregoing was electronically mailed to: Melody A. Hadley, Advocate for the Florida Commission on Ethics, Office of the Attorney General, The Capital, PL-0 l, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3300 (melody.hadley@myfloridalegal.com).
Isl R.W Evans
Attorney
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